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Abstract 
This commentary starts by attempting to clarify the ways in which Coelho Junior and 
Figueiredo (2003) use the logic of supplementarity to conceptualise the discourses on 
intersubjectivity in terms of four dimensions of otherness. A new domain of application is 
proposed and the limits of the approach are pointed to. In the second section I critically 
examine the extent to which these four dimensions, and the movements of supplementarity 
between them, adequately capture the theories of intersubjectivity. The use of these 
dimensions seems, on the one hand, to obfuscate several interesting contradictions between 
the theoretical approaches within the dimensions, and on the other hand, to artificially dualise 
the theoretical traditions between the four dimensions. In the final section, Mead’s account of 
intersubjectivity, and the constitution of subjectivity, is presented, and developed, as 
operating in the spaces between the proposed dimensions of otherness. 
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Coelho Junior and Figueiredo (2003), in their thoroughly broad ranging paper, 
advance the provocative, metatheoretical, position that there are four dimensions of 
intersubjectivity, each of which plays a part in the constitution of subjectivity, and that they 
are incommensurable with each other. These dimensions are four theoretically driven 
perspectives each bringing a different dimension of intersubjectivity, and otherness, to the 
fore. They take us beyond the idea that one theory of intersubjectivity and the constitution of 
subjectivity is more adequate than another, or indeed that the question of intersubjectivity can 
be resolved. Instead, they point to how the weaknesses of one dimension are supplemented by 
the strengths of another. This non-foundational, or perspectivist approach, is, needless to say, 
qualitatively different from recent attempts to synthesise the same literature according to 
different, types of intersubjectivity (e.g. Crossley 1996), and as such makes a distinctive 
contribution. 
 
The logic of supplementarity 
There is, however, an ambiguity in Coelho Junior and Figueiredo’s paper. What is the 
nature of these dimensions? There is a perpetual slippage between their uses of the words 
“dimension,” “matrix” and even “pole.” This is significant because sometimes the 
dimensions seem to indicate whole theoretical traditions, and at other times to indicate the 
poles of a binary opposition, each of which makes for quite a different interpretation of the 
paper.  
If we treat the matrices as indicating whole theories, then the proposition is that each 
of the theories reviewed has a certain validity in relation to the question of how subjectivity is 
constituted, and that to address this question we can profit by learning to commute between 
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them, rather than searching for a synthesis. If this is the argument, then one might wonder 
why introduce a new nomenclature for theories that already have names? 
The logic working between these matrices, Coelho Junior and Figueiredo write, is one 
of supplementarity. Derrida (1967/1974) develops the idea of supplementarity through his 
reading of Rousseau. Throughout Rousseau’s texts, Derrida finds a hierarchical nature-
culture binary opposition, in which nature is the privileged term and culture an unnatural 
supplement. This privilege carries into other areas so that speech is privileged over writing, 
and presentation over representation. Derrida pursues the notion of ‘supplement,’ and writes 
that, unlike the complement, “the supplement is exterior (…), alien to that which, in order to 
be replaced by it, must be other than it” (p.145). This allows Derrida to show that Rousseau’s 
privileged term, nature, is in fact incomplete (because it is supplemented by culture), and thus 
depends upon the subordinated term, culture, for its completeness. For example, Rousseau 
privileges “natural” childrearing practices, and bemoans the use of nannies, but the very need 
for childrearing practices, which come from outside of nature, reveal nature’s 
incompleteness. In the logic of supplementarity, the subordinated term in a binary opposition, 
that is exterior (not complementary) to the privileged term, returns and by reversing the 
hierarchy, replaces the privileged term. 
Reading Coelho Junior and Figueiredo’s paper through this lens, their project appears 
to be deconstruction with a happy ending. In their “final thoughts” they illustrate some of the 
movements of supplementation that they see at work among the four dimensions of otherness. 
Firstly they write that the interpersonal “forces” us to think of the intrapsychic. This suggests 
an interpersonal-intrapsychic opposition, where a privileging of either pole necessarily 
implies a return of the suppressed pole. They suggest that Mead privileges the interpersonal, 
and the psychoanalysts privilege the intrapsychic. Another opposition the authors point to is 
that between otherness and inclusion. Here, Levinas is placed on the otherness pole and the 
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other phenomenologists are placed on the inclusion pole. Again, the suggestion is that each is 
the counterpoint of the other. The logic of supplementarity is such that in both cases which 
ever way we state intersubjectivity, whichever poles of these binary opposites we privilege in 
our account, we find the account lacking and the subordinated term returns to unravel our 
construction. But Coelho Junior and Figueiredo’s analysis is not nihilistic. They offer a happy 
ending, because, at each point of supplementation, where one theory collapses, there is 
conveniently a supplementary theory that we can commute to. 
The deconstruction of our discourse into the movements of supplementarity between 
its constitutive binary pairs is powerful. It challenges the desire for foundations and synthesis. 
By introducing this logic, Coelho Junior and Figueiredo provides insights into why the 
literature on intersubjectivity has such little consensus. Our discourse has been trapped in a 
four-dimensional cage, and debates between these dimensions have been between false 
opposites. In what follows, I take up this provocative idea and try to articulate a further 
movement of supplementarity.  
Many of the phenomenologists, in the trans-subjective dimension, privilege the pre-
reflective; indeed there is nostalgia for it. The phenomenological method, which began with 
Descartes’ doubt, and his retreat to the ego, perhaps inevitably would start to look behind the 
ego, seeking out its own preconditions. Coelho Junior and Figueiredo refer to these 
preconditions as the “primordial trans-subjective soil” and the “original field,” out of which 
reflective consciousness arises as an alienated aberration. Take, for example, Merleau-Ponty 
(1962, p.242), who writes that “reflection does not itself grasp its full significance unless it 
refers to the unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and 
which constitutes for it a kind of original past”. Here, conscious reflection is left dependent 
upon an “original” pre-reflective past.  
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The suppressed pole, reflective consciousness, can be recovered by returning to 
William James’s (1884) paper on introspection (which Alfred Schuetz (1941) suggests 
influenced Husserl). In this paper, James introduces the ‘psychologist’s fallacy,’ which refers 
to the tendency for psychologists to get confused between what is in their mind and what is in 
the mind of their subjects. To apply this fallacy to the idea of pre-reflective experience, we 
only need to ask, in whose mind is this ‘pre-reflexive’ experience? The answer is that it is in 
the mind, or reflective consciousness, of the phenomenologist. Indeed, it is the act of 
reflexive consciousness, the epoché, that ‘discovers’ this pre-reflective domain. Thus the pre-
reflective depends upon the reflective conscious experience. 
Bringing this back to the literature on intersubjectivity, there is a tradition of theory 
and research that has emphasised reflective consciousness, especially mutual awareness of 
each other’s consciousness. Rommetveit (1974), developing from the work of Mead, 
Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein, puts forward the idea of an architecture of 
intersubjectivity. He writes, “intersubjectivity has (…) to be taken for granted in order to be 
achieved” (p.56). What Rommetveit means by this is that there is a partially shared 
architecture of perspectives that constitutes a shared taken-for-granted world, and that this 
must be assumed, in order for anything to be said, or understood. The intersubjectivity 
achieved, through the shared architecture, is a partially shared mutual awareness based on a 
partial interchange of perspectives. Such an interchange of perspectives is reflective 
consciousness. For example, in Hegel’s master-slave thesis (only the slave can get full 
recognition because recognition must come from someone equal or superior) self-
consciousness is seen to arise from consciousness of mutual recognition (Marková, 1984). 
Such interchange of perspectives, and thus reflective consciousness, is also evident in the 
work of Ichheiser (1949) who looked at misunderstandings, and Goffman’s (1956) study of 
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embarrassment. It takes two mutually aware consciousnesses to have the dynamics of 
recognition, misunderstanding and embarrassment.  
Thus the phenomenologists’ subordination of reflective consciousness can be 
supplemented by the approach of these authors, to open up questions about the 
intersubjectivity involved, for example, in the social emotions and identity. From the 
standpoint of the four dimensions proposed by Coelho Junior and Figueiredo, this conception 
of intersubjectivity would appear to be on the interpersonal dimension and to be 
supplementing the trans-subjective dimension. However, it would be wrong to say that the 
trans-subjective dimension can supplement Rommetveit’s architecture of intersubjectivity in 
any obvious way because that dimension is that which has to be assumed, so that reflective 
intersubjectivity can be (partially) achieved. Instead, it appears that Rommetveit’s approach 
occupies both poles. In the next section I will critically examine the extent to which the 
theories of intersubjectivity can be located on the four proposed dimensions. 
 
The boundaries between and within the dimensions 
Coelho Junior and Figueiredo do not explicitly recover the binary hinges upon which 
the debates on intersubjectivity swing, and the oppositions at work remain somewhat implicit. 
Instead, the logic of supplementarity appears to be transposed up, to function at the level of 
whole theoretical traditions. The potential problem with this is that it can end up polarising, 
and even dualising, the theoretical traditions by obfuscating the aspects of these traditions 
that theorised more than one dimension, or the dynamic between the dimensions. 
The question is, can the logic of supplementarity work on whole theories? The logic 
of supplementarity can only work where one side of an opposition has been privileged. This 
makes it particularly suited to traditions like phenomenology, which perhaps due to its roots 
in epistemology, has been led repeatedly to the idea of “first philosophy.” This is what 
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Descartes finds in “I think, therefore I am” and what Husserl finds in the transcendental ego. 
Despite differences, they are both located firmly on one side of an opposition which arguably 
presupposes the opposed term (mind-world, ego-other). Like Archimedes, who, on 
discovering the law of the lever, said ‘give me a place to stand and I will move the world,’ 
these theorists thought they had found a place from which to theorise the world (though 
perhaps unlike Archimedes they did not quite see how fundamentally the two sides of the 
lever, or a binary opposition, are related to each other). In such cases the logic of 
supplementarity works well, as Levinas showed when he recovered the other. But not all 
theories of intersubjectivity can be so easily characterised. 
Coelho Junior and Figueiredo recognise that the traditions they refer to do not sit 
easily on their prescribed poles. In their characterisation of the four matrices, a degree of 
overflow is evident: Psychoanalytic insights contribute to the traumatic matrix and the 
interpersonal matrix; Mead contributes to the trans-subjective matrix; and the trans-subjective 
is evident in the interpersonal.  Yet in so far as they recognise this overflow, they also imply 
that the matrices are independent of the theories, which then returns us to the question as to 
what status these matrices have. The point I want to make is that if the dimensions are 
independent of the theories, and the logic of supplementarity works between the dimensions, 
then we would expect there to be a logic of complementarity within the dimensions. But as I 
now show, this is not always the case. 
Take, as an example, the question of ethics, and the traumatic dimension. For Levinas 
(1991/1998), ethics arises in the unbounded responsibility that is demanded from self by the 
face of the other. This ethical determination of self’s being is primary and incomprehensible. 
Then, when there is a third (another other), self is forced to compromise his/her responsibility 
for the other due to the demands of the third. Caught in these two demands, self must 
compare two infinities, and this, Levinas speculates, is the origin of theoretical knowledge. In 
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this account, the ethical demand of the other precedes all knowledge. However, Mead also 
has a theory of ethics (e.g. 1913, p.378), which is closely tied to his social psychology. For 
Mead, although the other is initially everything, it is only later that the ethical demand arises. 
Mead locates the ethical in the dissolution of self that arises when self acknowledges the 
perspective of the other. Furthermore, because taking the perspective of the other is implicit 
in all knowledge, so the ability to be ethical expands with knowledge, rather than preceding 
knowledge. In regard to this question of ethics, both Levinas and Mead could be positioned 
on the traumatic dimension, yet their approaches are not complementary, and have 
fundamental differences. 
To examine further the distinction between the theoretical traditions and the 
dimensions, let us consider the following movement of supplementarity, which is identified 
in the final section of Coelho Junior and Figueiredo’s paper: 
Nonetheless, it is easy to see how the interpersonal leads us, in fact forces us, to think 
of intrapsychic intersubjectivity, as a self is constituted by introjecting complementary 
roles, being the result of processes of internalization (in primary and secondary 
socialization) which place significant others in the condition of what can be thought 
of in terms of instances and ‘internal objects.’ 
Here at the boundary between the interpersonal and the intrapsychic dimensions, there is a 
mixing of Meadian and psychoanalytic concepts. The things which are outside - 
complementary roles and significant others - are identified with Meadian concepts, while that 
which is intrapsychic - internal objects - is identified with psychoanalytic concepts. The 
psychoanalytic concepts that articulate the family, the reality beyond the patient and the 
psychoanalytic setting (e.g. the dynamics of transference and counter-transference, Green, 
2000) have been suppressed. And to sustain the counterpoint, the Meadian theorisation of the 
intrapsychic, the ‘I,’ the ‘me,’ internal dialogue and reflection, have been overlooked. The ‘I’ 
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(which is not the same as the phenomenologists’ transcendental ego) and the ‘me’ are not 
complementary to Freud’s second typology, of the id, ego and superego. Thus, again, we 
have two quite different theories occupying the same dimension. 
Turning next to the question of how Coelho Junior and Figueiredo get from the 
interpersonal to the intrapsychic we find the psychoanalytic concept of introjection, and 
Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) concept of primary and secondary socialisation. In 
Winnicott's object relations theory, the external object, (e.g. the mother) becomes associated 
with the child’s relation to a transitional object that does not leave when the mother does (e.g. 
a blanket) and that transitional object paves the way for the development of the internal 
object that stands for the mother in her absence. The important quality of the transitional 
object is that it cannot be reduced to either the intrapsychic or the external. This is, for 
Winnicott, “an essential paradox, one that we must accept and that is not for resolution” 
(1971 p.151). Mead also theorises this space between the dimensions, but his conception is 
quite different. In the social act, the metaphor of shifting perspectives between that of the 
actor and the observer replaces the metaphor of moving between inner and outer. Thus the 
question of introjection would be rephrased in terms of how an object for the observer 
becomes an object for the actor – how they come to share an object. This sharing of the world 
arises social interaction. The point I want to make is that although Coelho Junior and 
Figueiredo identify a movement of supplementarity between interpersonal and intrapsychic 
theories, in fact, both psychoanalytic and Meadian traditions theorise, in different ways, both 
poles of this opposition, and furthermore, they theorise the movement between the poles.  
It is wrong to overemphasise the differences between Mead and psychoanalysis, as 
there are interesting points of complementarity. For example, Mead (1926) made use of 
Freud to analyse the way films compensate for inferiority complexes, and on a couple of 
other occasions makes approving reference to the idea of the superego. Also, both Mead and 
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Freud, partly under the influence of Darwin, made use of social instincts (where the sex drive 
is a social instinct, Green 2000). Nonetheless, the characterisation of the literature in terms of 
the four proposed dimensions seems to run the risk of obscuring the aspects of theories that 
flow beyond their prescribed dimensions, thus silencing the potentially fruitful contradictions 
between approaches both within each of the dimensions, and between the dimensions. 
 
Surplus & subjectivity 
Besides applying the logic of supplementarity to the discourses on intersubjectivity, 
the professed aim of Coelho Junior and Figueiredo’s paper is to further our conceptualisation 
of the constitution and development of subjectivity. This theme is to the fore in the 
penultimate paragraph where it is suggested that otherness is necessary for subjectivity to 
emerge, but that this otherness needs to be supplemented with a sense of inclusion, otherwise 
the otherness is always beyond being and cannot enter into the constitution of subjectivity. In 
what follows I want to take up these suggestive remarks and try to further theorise this 
dynamic of supplementarity as it occurs within Mead’s theoretical approach.  
Mead (e.g. 1925) is a perspectivist and as such does not subscribe to any one place 
from which everything can be considered (which is quite in line with the thrust of Coelho 
Junior and Figueiredo’s paper). And although Mead chose to consider social psychology 
from the standpoint of the act, which is his basic unit of analysis, the act itself cannot be 
reduced to one side of the binary opposition between intrapsychic-interpersonal. Take for 
example Mead’s (1934, p.8) definition of the act: “The act (…) has both an inner and an outer 
phase, an internal and an external aspect.” The act moves across the perspective of the actor 
and the observer, such that mind and behaviour arise only as ‘phases’ within that movement. 
One of the few Meadian scholars to have highlighted this is Farr (1996, p.79), who writes of 
the act: “Both perspectives, however, are partial and, being the perspective of two quite 
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different individuals, they are incompatible with each other.” There can be no 
commensurability between the inner phase and the outer phase because they are in the 
perspectives of different individuals. The matrix that is the origin of Mead’s explanatory 
power, is not singular, nor static, but internally incommensurable with itself. 
Due to this incommensurability, the other always exceeds self. And for this reason, I 
think Mead can arguably occupy a place on the traumatic dimension of otherness. The 
difference between Levinas and Mead, in this regard, is that Mead stands outside of the 
perspective of self and other, while Levinas, in the phenomenological tradition, occupies the 
position of the self (i.e. the other exceeds me). The advantage of Mead’s approach is that he 
can move across the perspectives (which for Levinas is an act of violence). So while Levinas 
remains concerned with radical otherness, Mead moves between the perspectives, such that 
the otherness becomes relative (i.e. not only does other exceed self, but self exceeds other). 
However, one could also read Mead as belonging to the trans-subjective dimension 
because of his emphasis on our shared biological being, shared embodied actions and shared 
language. Through the organisation of society we come to enact various roles, and through 
newsprint, fiction, and imagination we vicariously participate in a diversity of roles. From 
childhood games, and the mass media, we all have the attitude of the policeman and the 
robber, the mother and the father, the rich person and the poor person within us. This is the 
attitude of the generalized other, which Coelho Junior and Figueiredo recognise as part of the 
trans-subjective dimension. From the perspective of the constitution of subjectivity, the most 
important aspect of the attitude of the generalized other is the shared attitudes that we have 
toward each other, because these are the attitudes which, when turned upon the self, 
constitute self-awareness. 
The double emphasis on sameness – the trans-subjective dimension – and difference – 
the traumatic dimension – is not unique to Mead. Hannah Arendt (1958, p.155), for example, 
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wrote that, if people were not different they would have nothing to say to each other, and if 
they were not the same they could not understand each other. The question is, what is the 
precise dynamic between these poles? 
The other does, as Levinas so eloquently argues, exceed self. But we can make a more 
specific statement than this. Taking up the perspective of the other, looking back toward self, 
there is a part of this excess that concerns self – in regard to certain things, the other knows 
more about self than does self. This is what Goffman (1959, p.14) refers to as the expression 
an actor “gives off” (e.g. visual appearance), as opposed to “gives” (e.g. speech), what 
Bakhtin (1923/1990, p.22) refers to as “excess” (e.g. the other sees the back of my head), and 
what Farr (1996, p.79), writing from the reverse perspective, refers to as a “blind spot.” The 
point is that, because the act crosses two perspectives, the actor has privileged access to the 
inner phase, while the observer has privileged access to the outer phase. I am interested in the 
outer phase, and will call the specific excess that the other has over self, surplus. Behaviours 
of self like blushing, slips of the tongue and appearance comprise some of the everyday 
surplus that the other has over self. In academia, commentaries are attempts to cultivate and 
return a surplus. 
According to Mead, for non-symbolic animals the other is everything – in the 
environment of such animals the other looms large, but there is no self to be found. Amongst 
such animals, each animal has an unshared surplus over the other animals. The defining 
feature of humans is that this surplus has become shared (i.e. we know who we are to each 
other). Humans are able to share their surplus in so far as each human has, within their social 
attitudes, the attitudes of others – the attitude of the generalised other. In regard to the 
constitution of subjectivity, the question is how these social responses, which are already 
shared (but orient to others), come to turn inwards so that the surplus that self has held over 
others in certain roles, can, when self is in the complementary role, be held over self. For 
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Mead, this occurs via the coordination offered by language (see, Dodds, Lawrence, & 
Valsiner, 1997).  
Through language, as manifest in shared activity, fiction and imagination, the surplus 
of the other is paired with the responses of self over which the surplus arises, such that self 
can experience a double attitude, the attitude of the actor, and the attitude that is the 
observer’s surplus, simultaneously. The simultaneous experience of these two 
incommensurable perspectives on the same act, so that it is experienced from both the inside 
and the outside, is reflective consciousness. Such reflective consciousness forms a new 
matrix for action, and possibly a new dimension of otherness, namely, being other to oneself. 
If this ability for self-mediation is what is meant by subjectivity, then, from the perspective 
developed here, it is the return of the surplus of the other to self that has grown into 
subjectivity. 
I have emphasised the idea of surplus because it moves across the space between the 
dimensions that Coelho Junior and Figueiredo propose. It is unclear whether the surplus 
belongs to radical otherness, to interpersonal interaction, to trans-subjective or even to the 
intrapsychic. As we saw with Rommetveit and object relations theory, the danger is that 
conceptualising the literature on intersubjectivity according to the four dimensions may in 
fact dualise theoretical traditions, and obscure their respective attempts to theorise the 
dynamics between the dimensions. Rather than transposing the logic of supplementarity from 
binary pairs up, so that it operates between whole theoretical traditions, I have tried to point 
out some places where the movement between these binaries is theorised within the 
theoretical traditions. Surplus arises from the excess of the other, from beyond self, and 
constitutes subjectivity by supplementing action towards the world with action towards 
oneself acting towards the world.  
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